A command injection vulnerability exists in the “dash export� feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user controlled input and passes it directly to a shell command. This allows for the injection of arbitrary commands to the underlying operating system.
A command injection vulnerability exists in the ticket report generate feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user controlled input and passes it directly to a shell command. This allows for the injection of arbitrary commands to the underlying operating system.
A command injection vulnerability exists in the dashboard scheduler feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user?controlled input and passes it directly to a shell command. This allows for the injection of arbitrary commands to the underlying operating system.
A command injection vulnerability exists in the download and convert report feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user?controlled input and passes it directly to a shell command. This allows for the injection of arbitrary commands to the underlying operating system.
A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the “admin brand portal� feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user?controlled input and passes it directly to a SQL query. This allows for the injection of arbitrary SQL before being executed against the database.
A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the “json walker� feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user?controlled input and passes it directly to a SQL query. This allows for the injection of arbitrary SQL before being executed against the database.
A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the “schedule editor� feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user?controlled input and passes it directly to a SQL query. This allows for the injection of arbitrary SQL before being executed against the database.
A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the “schedule editor decoupled� feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user?controlled input and passes it directly to a SQL query. This allows for the injection of arbitrary SQL before being executed against the database.
Как язык программирования Аргентум делает быстрый dynamic_cast и диспетчеризацию методов интерфейсов четырьмя инструкциями процессора. Читать далее
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