История начинается в 2017-м году - когда мне потребовался самодельный почтовый сервер на связке Postfix + Dovecot + Roundcube + LDAP-каталог (AD на тот момент). Сказано - сделано - времени ушло прилично (делалось для FreeBSD), но зато много в чем получилось досконально разобраться. И естественно была…
In convert2rhel, there's an ansible playbook named ansible/run-convert2rhel.yml which passes the Red Hat Subscription Manager user password via the CLI to convert2rhel. This could allow unauthorized local users to view the password via the process list while convert2rhel is running. However, this ansible playbook is only an example in the upstream repository and it is not shipped in officially supported versions of convert2rhel.
Ansible before versions 2.1.4, 2.2.1 is vulnerable to an improper input validation in Ansible's handling of data sent from client systems. An attacker with control over a client system being managed by Ansible and the ability to send facts back to the Ansible server could use this flaw to execute arbitrary code on the Ansible server using the Ansible server privileges.
A security flaw was found in Ansible Tower when requesting an OAuth2 token with an OAuth2 application. Ansible Tower uses the token to provide authentication. This flaw allows an attacker to obtain a refresh token that does not expire. The original token granted to the user still has access to Ansible Tower, which allows any user that can gain access to the token to be fully authenticated to Ansible Tower. This flaw affects Ansible Tower versions before 3.6.4 and Ansible Tower versions before 3.5.6.