https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/DSA-6264-1
A flaw was found in dnsmasq in versions before 2.85. When configured to use a specific server for a given network interface, dnsmasq uses a fixed port while forwarding queries. An attacker on the network, able to find the outgoing port used by dnsmasq, only needs to guess the random transmission ID to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This flaw makes a DNS Cache Poisoning attack much easier. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity.
A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. A heap-based buffer overflow was discovered in dnsmasq when DNSSEC is enabled and before it validates the received DNS entries. A remote attacker, who can create valid DNS replies, could use this flaw to cause an overflow in a heap-allocated memory. This flaw is caused by the lack of length checks in rfc1035.c:extract_name(), which could be abused to make the code execute memcpy() with a negative size in get_rdata() and cause a crash in dnsmasq, resulting in
A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query, dnsmasq checks in the forward.c:reply_query() if the reply destination address/port is used by the pending forwarded queries. However, it does not use the address/port to retrieve the exact forwarded query, substantially reducing the number of attempts an attacker on the network would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This issue contrasts with RFC5452, which specifies a query's…